




U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 17:
Steering Clear of the Scylla of the U.S.
Antidumping Law and the Charybdis of
Internal Revenue Code Section 482
United States companies importing merchandise produced by related foreign
firms must chart a careful course in establishing the external prices that they
charge to unrelated customers in the United States, and the internal transfer
prices that they pay to their foreign affiliates. Without a clear understanding of
the implications of pricing practices under various U.S. laws, U.S. companies
related to foreign firms may find themselves facing liability under several laws.
This article focuses on two U.S. laws under which U.S. firms related to a foreign
company can face significant liabilities as a result of such practices: the U.S.
antidumping law and section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Under the U.S. antidumping law, if the sales price a U.S. affiliate charges to
the first unrelated purchaser in the United States is too low, the product may
be found to have been "dumped" in the U.S. market. If the U.S. industry
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producing that product is injured or threatened with injury as a result of sales at
prices below "fair value," then the U.S. importer becomes liable for antidump-
ing duties, in addition to normal customs duties. On the other hand, if the
transfer price for products imported into the United States from an affiliate is too
high, then the U.S. importer can run squarely-and painfully-into section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code.
This article outlines the dumping/tax Scylla and Charybdis dilemma for U.S.
importers related to foreign producers and exporters. It points out the reasons for,
and mechanics of, the two statutory provisions and suggests how U.S. compa-
nies importing merchandise from related foreign entities may seek to avoid the
traps of these two laws.
I. The Antidumping Law
The countervailing duty I and antidumping laws2 are the core import relief laws
aimed at unfairly traded goods entering the U.S. market. While the countervail-
ing duty law is aimed at subsidized imports, the antidumping law focuses on
goods sold in the United States at unfairly low prices, to the detriment of the
U.S. industry producing such goods.
Most countervailing duty investigations 3 and all antidumping investigations 4
involve parallel investigations of injury by the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission, 5 and of subsidies or dumping by the International Trade Administration
of the Department of Commerce. 6 This article focuses on Commerce's "dump-
ing" determination.
Commerce's job in an antidumping investigation is to determine whether
imports are being sold at less than their "fair value." 7 In arm's-length transac-
tions between unrelated foreign producers or exporters and U.S. importers,
Commerce normally compares the sales price in the United States with a foreign
1. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, §§ 303, 701-707 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303,
1671-1671h (1988)).
2. Id. §§ 731-738, (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1988)).
3. Unless such imports are found by the International Trade Commission to cause or threaten
material injury to a U.S. industry, countervailing duties are not imposed on subsidized imports of
dutiable goods from countries: (I) to which the United States applies the Agreement on the Inter-
pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Subsidies Code), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619; (2) that have substan-
tially equivalent agreements with the United States; or (3) that were parties to certain agreements
entitling them to unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to articles imported into
the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1988). Unless the Commission finds such injury, countervailing
duties likewise are not imposed on subsidized imports of duty-free goods from countries where an
injury determination is required by the international obligations of the United States. Id. §
1303(a)(2).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
5. Id. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2).
6. Id. §§ 1671(a)(1), 1673(l).
7. Id. § 1673(l).
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market value. Foreign market value is determined pursuant to a statutory formula
and may be (in order of preference): (1) sales prices in the home market;
(2) sales prices in third country markets; or (3) the cost of production. 8 Com-
merce makes adjustments for differing movement charges, physical differences
in the merchandise being compared, and differing circumstances of sale and
levels of trade.
9
When sales are made by a foreign producer to a related U.S. company, the
antidumping law does not examine the transfer price between the two related
parties; rather, it examines the first arm's-length transaction in the United States
(in other words, the sales price charged to the first unrelated U.S. purchaser).
Using the price to the first unrelated purchaser avoids the problems inherent in
using transfer prices, which can reflect objectives regarding the distribution of
income within a corporate family, rather than market value of the product con-
cerned. 10
The transfer price may be a factor, however, in the calculation of certain
charges and adjustments to the price charged to the first unrelated purchaser. For
example, Commerce subtracts the U.S. duties paid on the imported merchandise
from the U.S. price before comparing the U.S. price to the foreign market
value." United States duties are paid on the valuation of the merchandise for
U.S. customs purposes. If the transfer price is higher than the customs valuation,
there may be a question of customs fraud. ' 2 For this type of adjustment, the U.S.
importer benefits from a low transfer price, because it reduces the amount of
duties owed. The lower the U.S. duties paid, the lower the amount deducted
from the U.S. price charged to the first unrelated customer. This in turn results
in a higher U.S. price, increasing the likelihood of an affirmative "fair value"
determination.
Transfer prices may also be subject to scrutiny in an antidumping investigation
if the merchandise imported by the foreign firm's related U.S. affiliate undergoes
further manufacture or assembly in the United States prior to its sale to the first
unrelated U.S. purchaser. Under Commerce's antidumping regulations," 3 the
U.S. price is reduced by the amount of any value added through further pro-
cessing or assembly. The value added is determined from the cost of materials,
fabrication, and other expenses incurred in the processing or assembly. In ad-
justing the U.S. price for value added, Commerce also includes any profit at-
8. Id. §§ 1677a, 1677b.
9. Id. § 1677a(d).
10. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code exists precisely because of the tendency of
inter-affiliate prices to stray from ann's-length value. I.R.C. § 482.
11. 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(i) (1989).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1988) establishes monetary penalties for fraud, gross negligence and
negligence in connection with the entry of merchandise into the United States (regardless of whether
the United States is deprived of any duty as a result thereof).
13. 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(3) (1989).
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tributable to the value added in the United States. 14 Although Commerce would
not generally use transfer prices in calculating the profit ratio for value-added
purposes, it has used them as "best information otherwise available" (which is
usually adverse to the U.S. company and its foreign affiliate in terms of the effect
on the dumping margin). 15
In addition to potential liability under the antidumping law, a U.S. importer
and its foreign affiliate may be concerned about: (1) Commerce's ability to
request extensive information about the U.S. importer's operations and the for-
eign company's U.S. and home market operations and (2) Commerce's broad
access to corporate books and records to verify that the information so provided
is accurate. 16 While Commerce has no subpoena power to compel the production
of such information and access, its use of "best information otherwise available"
ensures cooperation by most foreign companies with Commerce's antidumping
investigations. 17
II. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code
Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (the Code) allows the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to reallocate income among affiliated organizations if the
IRS determines such allocation is necessary "clearly to reflect the income of any
of such organizations."' 8 When the IRS believes that a foreign manufacturer has
charged its U.S. affiliate more than an arm's-length price, it attempts to increase
the taxable income of the U.S. subsidiary to the level that would have been
produced if payments by the subsidiary to the parent had been lower. 19
The taxable income adjustment can readily yield enormous potential tax lia-
bility. For example, if 500,000 automobiles are sold each year by a foreign parent
to its U.S. subsidiary, a $100 price adjustment per vehicle would produce $50
million in additional taxable income for the U.S. subsidiary. As sales volume
increases, the size of the potential tax adjustment rises quickly.
In 1986, the Code rules relating to intercompany transfer prices were substan-
tially amended. The legislative history of those amendments reveals that Con-
14. These adjustments are somewhat similar to the "resale price method" of determining an
arm's-length transfer price under § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2(e)(3)(1990). However, while the tax analysis uses the uncontrolled resale price as a starting point
for the construction of a hypothetical arm's-length transfer price between the foreign manufacturer
and its affiliated U.S. importer, the dumping law focuses on the uncontrolled price itself.
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988); see, e.g., Certain Internal Combustion Forklift Trucks from
Japan, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,552 (Dep't Comm. 1988) (final determination): "For Toyota, we calculated
a net profit factor on forklift sales for Toyota Motor Sales (TMS), the U.S. subsidiary of Toyota,
during the period of investigation. We then applied this factor to the transfer price between Toyota
and TMS as best information available." Id. at 12,565 (emphasis added).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1988).
17. Id. § 1677e(c); cf. infra note 24 and accompanying text.
18. I.R.C. § 482.
19. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(b), 1.482-2(e)(1)(i) (1990).
VOL. 24, NO. 4
U.S. TRADE LAW & POLICY SERIES NO. 17 1103
gress was concerned that the manner in which transfer prices were established
between related corporations across national boundaries often had the effect of
depriving the United States of its "proper" income tax revenues. The 1986
amendments were intended as a step in correcting perceived abuses in this area,
and Congress clearly expects the Internal Revenue Service to scrutinize such
transactions vigilantly.
20
One amendment was the addition of section 1059A of the Code, 2 ' which
provides that, in calculating the taxable income of a U.S. distributor, the inven-
tory cost of the products it purchases from a related foreign manufacturer may
not exceed the value of the products for customs purposes. As a result, declaring
a low value for a product for U.S. customs purposes may effectively increase the
U.S. income tax paid by the U.S. distributor.
22
A U.S. importer purchasing goods from a foreign affiliate may not claim a
transfer price for U.S. income tax purposes that is higher than would be con-
sistent with the value claimed for customs purposes. Although the customs value
(as appropriately adjusted) provides a ceiling on the transfer price for income tax
purposes, it does not provide a floor. Thus, the IRS retains the right to adjust the
transfer price downward from the customs price, and thereby to adjust U.S.
taxable income upward. 23
In addition to the risk of substantial tax liability, foreign manufacturers may be
troubled by the IRS's ability, as part of its section 482 enforcement powers, to
obtain sales or manufacturing data relating entirely to the foreign parent's non-
U.S. operations. For example, during an investigation of Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration's charges to its U.S. distribution affiliate, the IRS issued a summons
seeking price data relating to sales by Toyota within Japan. Notwithstanding a
diplomatic note from the Japanese government objecting to the summons, the
U.S. District Court in California enforced the summons, ordering production of
the Japanese price data.
24
In late 1989 Congress amended the tax laws to give the IRS even greater
powers to obtain information regarding transactions between foreign companies
20. See JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at
1011-18, 1061-62 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 BLUE BOOK].
21. I.R.C. § 1590A, added by, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1248(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2584 (1986).
22. Other amendments were enacted in 1986 that, while significant, do not directly pose a
Scylla/Charybdis dilemma with respect to mirror antidumping liability. For example, § 482 now
requires that, in the case of "any transfer (or license) of intangible property . . . the income with
respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intan-
gible." I.R.C. § 482, as amended by, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63
(1986). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING (1988). This
provision grew out of congressional concerns relating to U.S. corporations that transfer potentially
valuable intangibles (e.g., patents) to affiliated companies in low-tax jurisdictions, but the statute as
enacted applies as well to foreign corporations transferring intangibles to the United States. Because
intangibles are not subject to the antidumping law, this provision does not raise directly (although it
may indirectly impact) dual tax/antidumping issues.
23. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 20, at 1062.
24. United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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and their U.S. affiliates. As amended, section 6038A of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that any corporation engaged in business within the United States
that is at least 25 percent foreign-owned must specially report to the IRS, and
retain records relating to, all transactions between itself and related foreign
corporations. Furthermore, section 6038A now gives the IRS expanded power to
require foreign corporations to provide the IRS with documents and testimony
relevant to transactions between such corporations and related corporations doing
business in the United States.25 Legislation presently pending in Congress, if
enacted, will further strengthen the powers of the IRS with respect to cross-
border transactions.26
In accordance with Congress' intention that the IRS scrutinize transfer prices
between U.S. subsidiaries and foreign affiliates closely, enforcement activity un-
der section 482 appears to be increasing. Earlier this year the IRS confirmed that
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies have become an important focus
of IRS audit efforts because of a concern that they have been underpaying cor-
porate income taxes in the United States.27 IRS officials reportedly indicated that
the cases in progress suggest that underpayments by such companies over the past
several years could amount to as much as $12 billion. 28 Furthermore, in a February
22, 1990, news release, the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee
on Ways and Means announced plans to investigate allegations that U.S. sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies are underpaying their corporate income taxes.
III. Steering a Course Between the Antidumping and Tax Laws
With careful planning a foreign manufacturer with a U.S. affiliate may be able
to structure its affairs so as to minimize its U.S. tax and antidumping risks.
While it will never be possible to eliminate entirely the risk of liability under one
(or even both) law, proper planning (combined with proper documentation) can
minimize the risk and potential magnitude of a tax adjustment or antidumping
duty liability.
Regarding the antidumping law, to avoid antidumping liability the starting
point for pricing in the United States is to ensure that U.S. prices are not
generally lower than prices for comparable goods in the home or third country
markets. The lower U.S. prices are in relation to home and third country prices,
the more likely that Commerce could find "dumping" in the United States.
Even if U.S. sales prices exceed home market or third country prices, Com-
merce may still find dumping if the home market or third country sales are at
25. See I.R.C. § 6038A(e).
26. H.R. 4308, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2410, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
27. Pine, IRS Audits U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1990, at
A20, col. 1; Stout, IRS Seeks to Determine if Foreign Firms Owe Billions of Dollars in U.S. Taxes,
Wall S. J., Feb. 20, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
28. Pine, supra note 27; Stout, supra note 27.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
U.S. TRADE LAW & POLICY SERIES NO. 17 1105
prices below the cost of production, based on recovery of fully allocated (not just
marginal) costs. 2 9 If a petitioning U.S. industry alleges home market or third
country sales below such costs, and Commerce initiates a cost of production
investigation, Commerce has even more discretion in constructing a cost-based
benchmark (with which to compare U.S. sales prices) than it does in making
adjustments to prices charged in the United States and the home market (or third
country). In these circumstances Commerce constructs a cost-based benchmark
to compare to the U.S. price, which includes not only fully allocated costs, but
also a statutory minimum of ten percent for general expenses and eight percent
for profit. 30 In a cost situation then, a U.S. importer and its foreign affiliate have
the greatest difficulty by far of structuring their affairs in advance so as to prevent
a later possible "dumping" determination by the Commerce Department.
Simplistically, the way to avoid dumping allegations by U.S. producers and
antidumping duties is to charge a relatively high price to unrelated customers in
the United States. However, the higher that price is in relation to the transfer
price between the U.S. company and its foreign affiliate, the greater the U.S.
affiliate's potential tax liability. To minimize the potential tax liability under
these circumstances, the related U.S. and foreign companies may decide to
increase the transfer price. However, if the transfer price is increased, the IRS
will be more likely to find underpayment of U.S. income taxes!
The purpose of section 482 is manifestly quite different from that of the
antidumping provisions; the latter exist to protect domestic manufacturers from
unfair foreign competition, while the former is intended solely to protect the
federal treasury. Specifically, with respect to inbound transfers of manufactured
products, section 482 is designed to prevent foreign manufacturers from divert-
ing income from U.S. tax jurisdiction by "overcharging" their domestic affil-
iates. The arm's-length price-in other words, the price a manufacturer would
charge an unrelated distributor for the same product-is the standard for deter-
mining whether such an overcharge has occurred.
The regulations under section 482 describe three methods for determining an
arm's-length price: (1) the comparable uncontrolled price method; (2) the resale
price method; and (3) the cost plus method. 3' These methods are often not easily
applied, and they have been the subject of criticism. Nevertheless, a foreign
manufacturer would be well-advised to set its prices to its domestic affiliate with
an awareness of the arm's-length standard and with such information and doc-
umentation as would support its prices under the regulations elaborating upon
that standard. A manufacturer that does so will be in a far better position-and
29. 19 C.F.R. § 353.51 (1989).
30. id. § 353.50(a)(2).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (1990) for a description of these three methods. When the
standards for none of these methods are satisfied, a "fourth method'--to wit, any other "appro-
priate method of pricing'--may be used. See id. § 1.482-2(e)(iii).
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will be far less likely to face a large tax deficiency-than one that first must begin
to attempt a defense of its prices on a post-hoc basis after the IRS raises the issue
on audit.
Two relatively recent developments may potentially be helpful to foreign
manufacturers concerned about section 482. First, as noted earlier,32 section 482
as amended in 1986 requires that, in the case of a license or transfer of an
intangible, the income attributable to such transfer or license "shall be com-
mensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.' 33 This provision could
support substantial charges by a foreign manufacturer to an affiliated domestic
distributor to reflect the fact that the most valuable intangibles (such as a patent
or trade name) typically originate with the manufacturer, not the distributor.
Second, the IRS is expected by late summer to publish a procedure pursuant to
which any corporation that chooses may request an advance determination by the
IRS as to whether its proposed method for setting intercompany prices conforms
with the requirements of section 482. Such an advance determination would
reduce the risk of future, potentially costly tax litigation. On the other hand, the
process of obtaining an advance determination is itself likely to be time-
consuming because the IRS will require a substantial amount of data and typi-
cally will have to coordinate its determination with the tax authorities in the
manufacturer's home country.
IV. Conclusion
In establishing both internal transfer prices and external prices to unrelated
U.S. customers, U.S. companies and their related foreign affiliates may not be
able to avoid collision with either-or both-the U.S. antidumping and tax laws.
Nonetheless, such collisions are far more likely if transfer prices and market
prices are established in ignorance of these laws. The better they are understood
in advance, the more likely it is that significant liability under these laws may be
avoided.
32. See supra note 22.
33. I.R.C. § 482.
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